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Abstract
Objectives Klinger’s (Criminology 35(2): 277–306, 1997) ecological theory of policing
addresses the intersection of environment and police organizational structure on police
patrol practices. The current study addresses the following question: ‘Is police response to
calls for service influenced by the level of serious violent crime or the level of officer
staffing?’
Methods This question was addressed using crime, incident, and staffing data supplied by
the Philadelphia Police Department. The dependent variable was the number of unfounded
events per month, per police district, from 2004 to 2008. Analysis controlled for linear and
non-linear trends, average monthly temperature, month length, and spatial effects. Data
were analyzed using repeated measures multilevel modeling.
Results Findings suggested that the quantity of unfounded events was associated with
both workload and officer staffing levels. Consistent with theoretical predictions, higher
workload was associated with more unfounded incidents while higher levels of officer
staffing was associated with fewer unfounded incidents, net of ongoing trends and spatial
effects.
Conclusions These findings are consistent with the Ecological Theory of Policing and
suggest that officers may shed workload in response to higher demands for service or lower
levels of officer availability.
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Introduction
Scholars have argued that neighborhood effects on police behaviors are influenced by a
multitude of organization and community characteristics (Sobal 2010a). Klinger’s eco-
logical theory1 describes policing as a balance between numerous forces: formal and
informal cultures, legal regulations and work group norms, resources and enforcement, and
individual and collective rights. These characteristics have been discussed, and continue to
be examined, by many scholars (e.g., Phillips and Sobal 2011, 2012; Sobal 2010a, b; Smith
1986; Slovak 1987; Sun 2002; Terrill and Reisig 2003). Klinger’s theory argues that officer
actions can be characterized along a continuum of formal authority ranging from vigorous
to lenient, where arrest represents more vigor than nonarrest, filing a report more vigor than
not filing a report, and so forth. The theory predicts that the vigor through which officers
use their formal authority varies inversely to the district crime level because officers (1)
view crime as more acceptable in higher-crime areas; (2) view victims less sympatheti-
cally; (3) continually deal with repeat offenders in high-crime areas, leading to officer
cynicism; and (4) have less time to allocated to resolving service calls in higher-crime
districts (Klinger 1997).
Police operate with a great deal of autonomy, both at an organizational level (Brogden
1982; Marenin 1985) and as individual officers (Bittner 1967; De Lint 2000; Ericson 1982;
Lundman 1979). Klinger argued that, nevertheless, officers do not act without constraints.
These constraints either come from formal bureaucratic regulation or develop as part of the
norms within a work group; it is these informal work group constraints that Klinger’s
ecological theory focuses on. Saying that officers operate with autonomy does not nec-
essarily imply that officers will exercise their discretion in the same way in all locations.
Stated differently, officers may alter their discretionary behavior on the basis of factors
related to the individual incident, or of the environmental characteristics of where the
crime occurred. This suggests that there may be spatial variations in how and where
officers exercise discretion.
Klinger’s theory focused on explaining why police behavior varies and what role police
organizations and ecological factors have in influencing police behaviors. The theory has
been incorporated into numerous areas of policing, but it has had relatively few empirical
tests given its prevalence. The minimal testing that Klinger’s theory has received may be
due to the difficulty of measuring key constructs, as well as to the challenges of using the
level of aggregation necessary to explore the role of broad ecological influences on police
activities.
The primary goal of the current study is to examine a portion of Klinger’s theory.
Specifically, we test the influence of organizational and environmental contextual factors,
guided by Klinger’s theory, on one measure of officer vigor. To date, few studies have
taken this approach to examining Klinger’s theory. The study builds on prior research that
has tested aspects of Klinger’s theory and adds new analytic strategies that prior studies
have not used. The results of this study have implications for both theory and practice, and
they add to the growing literature examining the influence of ecological and organization
factors on police behavior.
1 In the interest of clarity in this article, the term ‘‘ecological theory’’ is used in reference to Klinger’s
(1997) ecological theory of policing. However, Klinger’s is not the only theory that attempts to explain the
spatial variation found in police activity.
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Relevant Literature
The Ecology of Police Patrol
Research has demonstrated that police officers have broad understandings of the geo-
graphic areas to which they are assigned. These understandings often shape, and are shaped
by, interactions between the officer and the community. Numerous researchers have noted
the importance of how police conceptualize the space in which they work (Brown 1981;
Herbert 1997). Knowledge of dangerous places, situations, or people is shared among
officers so that common themes develop among patrol work groups. Klinger (1997) pro-
poses a mediated model that links two factors driving the development of work group
norms regarding the vigor used to enforce laws: the workload of the district and the
prevalence of other social (noncriminal) problems in a district. The district workload
sharply affects the amount of vigor officers are willing to expend on less-serious offenses.
Officers in districts with higher workloads will expend less vigor toward less-serious
events than officers in districts with lower workloads. Districts that are high in crime are
also likely to be high in other noncriminal social problems such as mental illness,
homelessness, and alcoholism (Faris 1948).
Although it is not the focus of the present study, it is important to note that scholars
have found that certain neighborhoods may be criminogenic despite factors such as
turnover in racial/ethnic groups (Stark 1987). As such, police may also have a distinct
attitude toward a specific neighborhood on the basis of its reputation. In Klinger’s model,
workload and the prevalence of these other social problems drives the development of
work group norms. These work group norms develop at the district level of the organi-
zational structure. The variation in workload, community demographics, and environ-
mental factors are the focus of the current study.
Klinger identified several organizational factors that drive the development of
stable work groups centered on police patrol. Klinger asserts that these factors, which are
consistent across jurisdictions, have to do with how police patrols are organized and how
the command structure deals with the activities of the patrol officer. First, police patrol is
usually a clearly identifiable group, separate from other branches of the organization.
Second, officers generally patrol a district on a semi-permanent basis. Finally, two or more
officers usually respond to any incident that may pose a risk to officer safety. This means
that officers must work in groups to resolve many situations. The stability of patrol officer
work groups and group interaction is important because it builds a district wide shared
understanding of the community in which they police.
Turning to work rules, Klinger argues that regardless of the type, structure, or nature of
the organizational structure, administrators can provide only limited supervision of patrol
officers. Formal rules cannot cope with the complexity of interactions that police are
required to handle. Administrators must defer to broad formal mandates regarding the
appropriate actions in any particular situation. This leaves patrol officers with a high
degree of autonomy regarding the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of laws. Adminis-
trators in law enforcement organizations are further hampered by the spatial and temporal
distribution of police patrol work. As supervisors get more distant, either organizationally,
spatially, or temporally, they have less direct influence over how patrol officers handle any
particular situation.
This separation from supervisors does not, however, indicate that individual officers are
able to exercise their discretion in isolation from other members of the organization.
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Although some authors argue that each officer constructs individual styles of policing
(Brown 1981; White 1972), Klinger instead argues that a combination of individual and
organizational factors determines how patrol work is conducted. Instead, groups of officers
conduct negotiations to effectively set rules that allow them to handle situations within the
organizational framework.
Klinger’s ecological theory of policing suggests that rule negotiations occur at the
district level. These negotiations are based, at least in part, on the understanding of district-
level deviance shared among officer work groups. First, districts vary on both the quantity
and type of work that an officer may encounter. Officers in high-crime districts tend to be
busier than officers in low-crime districts, even after accounting for variations in officer
staffing. Second, officers within a district share a common communications system. This
shared communication system informs officers how busy their peers are and what types of
activities other officers are conducting. Third, how officers perceive district-level deviance
is shaped by the public life of residents and visitors in their patrol areas. In high-crime
districts, officers are more likely to see criminals in public and are more likely to see
crimes committed in public (Klinger 1997). High-crime areas also have a greater pro-
portion of highly visible activities such as prostitution and open-air drug distribution
(Rengert et al. 2005; Weisburd et al. 2006).
Klinger’s negotiated order theory is grounded in two theoretical perspectives: stability
of punishment and the overload hypothesis. The stability of punishment theory argues that
there is a general equilibration in the levels of deviance in a given population over time. In
high-crime areas, only highly deviant acts are punished (Durkheim 1938). Acts that would
be considered deviant in low-crime areas are seen acceptable in high-crime areas
(Moynihan 1993). The overload hypothesis explains the relationship between deviance and
quantity of punishment through limitations in the capacity of social control institutions
(Geerken and Gove 1975; Geerken and Gove 1977). Increased crime rates strain the
capacity of social control institutions, resulting in less energy being devoted to each case,
and thereby reducing the certainty of punishment. Both theories predict an inverse rela-
tionship between punishment and crime rates: as crime levels increase, the amount of
punishment meted out cannot keep pace. Compensation for changing levels of deviance
can come from any number of locations throughout the criminal justice system. Klinger
(1997) suggests that police patrol officers function as early screeners within this system and
that the intensity with which they pursue law enforcement is at least partially contingent
upon the prevailing level of crime in an area.
To summarize, Klinger’s ecological theory argues that officer understanding of district
deviance is shaped by the district workload, a shared understanding of district deviance,
and officers’ observing deviance occurring in public spaces. These understandings are
shared among officers within a district because these factors are stable over time and
because patrol work tends to be group work. These understandings ultimately form the
basis of work group norms.
Negotiated Order in Police Work
The early theoretical framework of negotiated order developed from a study of work
groups in two psychiatric hospitals (Strauss et al. 1963). These researchers were concerned
with how order could be maintained within the complex organizational framework of the
hospital. Traditional rational-bureaucratic theory (Weber 1947) suggested that actors
should turn to administratively defined rules and regulations when dealing with complex
interactions (Udy 1959). Strauss et al. (1963) identified two limitations with this
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perspective. First, many actors within the system were not fully aware of all the rules.
Second, hospital rules and regulations were neither extensive nor explicit enough to deal
with the many situations that personnel encountered. This observation suggested that an
organization may have too many rules and, at the same time, these rules may lack the depth
necessary to encompass all potential situations an employee can encounter.
The ecological theory of policing uses negotiated order perspective to explain how
differences across patrol districts lead to differences in negotiated work group rules.
Negotiated rules are determined by environments, mandates, and the work that must be
done. The environment is of particular importance because patrol officers become totally
immersed in the social and ecological context of their districts (Reiss and Bordura 1967).
Klinger (1997) articulates these ideas through four points: normal crime, deservedness of
victims, police cynicism, and workload.
First, officers in high-crime districts tend to define deviance downward. These officers
bear witness to serious crimes more frequently than officers in lower-crime districts.
Officers in high-crime districts, therefore, view disorder-related offenses as normal and not
warranting a vigorous police response. As district-level deviance increases, officers will be
more likely than their peers in low-crime districts to view more highly serious crime as
more normal or acceptable.
Second, officers in both high-crime and low-crime districts believe that many victims
bring crime upon themselves and that many victims of crime are themselves criminals. The
criminal in one situation can quickly become the victim in another (Lauritsen et al. 1991).
Officers believe that when offenders are victimized, they are less worthy of a vigorous
police response. As district-level deviance increases, officers will believe that fewer vic-
tims of crime are worthy of vigorous police response.
Third, officers in high-crime districts are more cynical than officers in low-crime dis-
tricts. High-crime areas can be perceived as an indication of a failed criminal justice
system. Officers in high-crime districts arrest the same people time and again. These
repeated contacts with the same criminals leave officers with the feeling that, regardless of
their actions, criminals will be returned to the street and crime will remain high in that
district. Officers in high-crime districts deal with this cyclical process to a greater degree
than officers in low-crime districts. This increases cynicism and reduces officer vigor.
Finally, districts with a greater workload will be less vigorous in enforcing laws. Officers
are aware of the workload in their assigned district; they know that a backlog of calls
requiring their attention is likely to occur if they do not deal with events efficiently. The
ultimate decision for the officer rests upon how much time, effort, or resources should be
devoted to any particular case. These decisions are made even more important by the
organizational management structure. Officers have greater autonomy in incident disposition
than they do in work quantity assigned. In these situations, officers have incentives to focus
on more serious crimes and reduce the amount of time spent on minor crimes (Lipsky 1980).
There are two exceptions to these negotiations. First, homicide always results in vigorous
police actions, regardless of other situational or organizational factors. Second, events
threatening officer safety will always receive vigorous police actions. These events are
never considered normal; they always result in the most vigorous law enforcement efforts.
Evaluations of Negotiated Order in Patrol Work
An extensive literature search reveals only a few studies aimed directly at assessing the key
points of Klinger (1997) theory. The first of these studies, Hassell (2005), shed a great deal
of light on many of Klinger’s key postulates. The study was conducted (using field work,
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interviews, and administrative data) in an undisclosed Midwestern city police department
with 760 sworn police officers. Hassell found only limited support for a number of
Klinger’s key theoretical components. Numerous key predictions were not supported by
the findings. Hassell (2005) concluded that the general causal model demonstrated utility in
analyzing police activity. Perhaps most importantly, police patrol practices did demon-
strate substantial variation at the district level. As such, the district level was a valid
aggregate unit for study. The more specific and nuanced predictions made by the model,
however, were unsupported by the findings.
More recently, Sobal (2010a) examined if Klinger’s theory of negotiated order could be
used to explain whether district crime and deviance levels shape police attitudes toward
residents. Sobal’s study used data from the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN),
which collected data from two cities, Indianapolis, IN, and St Petersburg, FL. These data
included social observations, census data, police crime records, interviews with officers.
Controlling for individual and organizational factors, Sobal found that district crime rates
did influence levels of police cynicism. Officers assigned to higher-crime districts had
higher levels of cynicism. Sobal also found that officers with more experience had lower
levels of cynicism. Sobal’s findings provide support for Klinger’s argument that district
crime levels influence levels of police cynicism.
In another study, Sobal (2010b) used the POPN to conduct a partial test of Klinger’s
theory, specifically focusing on officer cynicism and workload and how they influence the
vigor of police response. The results of the study found little influence of cynicism and
district workload on the crime/vigor relationship as proposed by Klinger. These results
suggest that other factors may be influencing the crime/vigor relationship.
While Sobal’s studies represent an important step in the testing of Klinger’s work, there
is a need for continued study of Klinger’s theory. The present study provides an additional
test of Klinger’s theory from a different perspective than that of Sobal, exploring whether it
is possible to measure the relationship between officer staffing and the quantity of ‘‘work’’
produced. Furthermore, the present study also provides a test of Sobal’s work and may help
clarify his findings, and it also adds a temporal component to the analysis that other studies
have not included.
The Effects of Neighborhoods on Policing
Broadening the scope of relevant research produces numerous studies that have considered
the relationship between community sociostructural factors and the police. With few
exceptions, researchers have found that neighborhood characteristics have a substantial
impact on police activity.2 The effects of neighborhoods and underlying sociodemographic
characteristics cannot be overestimated (Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969). This finding has
important implications for Klinger’s theory. The true nature of police vigor will be most
manifest in situations that have the most situational ambiguity. Therefore, an analysis of
patrol officer vigor is most likely to result in variation in regard to acts that are considered
less serious. We are most likely to see variations in the application of vigor for events that
are of a less serious nature, and this variation will be based on the factors laid out in
Klinger’s theory.
2 One of the few exceptions to this finding was the research conducted by Slovak (1986) analyzing police
activity along three dimensions (police-initiated activity, percentage of cases formalized, and police
response time) at the neighborhood level in three cities. Although neighborhoods did vary significantly on
all three measures, these variations were often substantively small.
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Reiss and Bordura (1967) argue that informal practices in police departments allow
officers to vary their use of formal authority depending on the position of the social group
involved—and specifically that police may accept higher levels of crimes among disad-
vantaged minority communities. If this premise is true, the relationship may manifest itself
in a manner consistent with predictions under the ecological theory of policing.
With rare exceptions, such as Slovak (1986), the literature has consistently shown that
community factors affect where and how police services are delivered (Terrill and Reisig
2003). For example, Terrill and Reisig sought to examine the effect of neighborhood on
police use of force. Using data from the POPN, social observations, census data, police
crime records, and interviews with officers, Terrill and Reisig (2003) found support for the
notion that neighborhood influences police use of force, with police being more likely to
use higher levels of force in neighborhoods with greater levels of disadvantage. Underlying
the discussion of how police services are delivered is the idea that police operate with a
great deal of discretion.
Data
These analyses use data provided by the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). The fourth
largest department in the country, the PPD employs over 6300 uniformed police officers
and has an annual operations budget of over $600 million (Philadelphia Police Department
2016a, b). It has six patrol divisions and 25 districts (Philadelphia Police Department
2008b). For reasons articulated by Klinger, and because of the organizational structure of
the PPD, the district is the organizational unit appropriate for this analysis. Twenty-three
districts were included in this analysis. Two special-purpose districts, the Philadelphia
International Airport and Fairmount Park, are excluded from this analysis because of their
special role within the department and their substantially different operational mandates
compared with those of other districts. Although not used in the models, socioeconomic
characteristic of police districts can be found in Table 1.
The ecological theory proposes a relationship between environmental and organiza-
tional variables and general police actions. These actions are on a scale of formal authority
ranging from high vigor to leniency. The dependent variable, therefore, must quantify an
officer’s actions along this continuum. The outcome measure was the number of incidents
that were unfounded per district per month. In Philadelphia, events are unfounded only if
an officer investigates a call and no offense or incident was completed or attempted. This
disposition code is intended for use only when officers take no action on the call. Events
Table 1 District-level descriptives
Characteristic Min Max Mean SD
Population 25,266.36 124,705.82 65,892.80 30,174.69
Percent black in police district 3.0 94.0 42.7 32.9
Percent population hispanic 1.0 55.0 8.1 12.8
Percent residents with tenure more than 5 years 36.0 69.0 60.8 8.5
Percent with less than high school education 11.0 52.0 30.6 11.1
Percent of housing units owner occupied 29.0 73.0 56.9 12.5
Median household income $10,879.73 $60,161.31 $30,214.54 $13,420.85
N = 23
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that are founded represent more officer vigor than cases that are unfounded. Unfounding an
event occurs at one of the earliest stages of processing. The ecological theory predicts
systematic variation in the number of unfounded calls: The highest-crime districts should
have the highest number of unfounded calls, as officers seek to balance their workload by
not exercising authority in low-seriousness events.3
Figure 1 demonstrates the number of unfounded incidents during the study period.
Unfounded events have been used in previous studies of police activity. For
example, Maxfield et al. (1980) used the ratio of founded to unfounded events to
investigate police performance. They found three key things. First, there were dramatic
differences between what callers reported to dispatchers and what police officers
officially reported. Second, and consistent with the theory being tested here, the ratio
of founded to unfounded events was dependent upon the district’s level of demand for
police services. Higher demand for police services in a given district was related to a
greater percentage of unfounded events. Finally, the relationship between founded and
unfounded events was not dependent upon racial or socioeconomic characteristics of
the area where the event occurred.
Black (1970: 734) argued that reported events, unfounded events, and the relationship
between them represent ‘‘an empirical phenomenon with its own existential integrity.’’ He
posited that the study of unfounded events could be used to inform about police under-
standing of deviance (in contrast to a citizen’s understanding of deviance).
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Fig. 1 Citywide temporal trends of unfounded events
3 We note that this is correct only insofar as the average seriousness of the calls to which officers are
dispatched in each district is taken into account. It could well be that, in some districts with very high levels
of crime, officers are dispatched to a very large proportion of serious crimes, which would prevent
unfounding a high number of calls. Similarly, it is possible that in low-crime districts officers are dispatched
primarily to trivial matters that do not involve an actual crime, which would lead to high levels of
unfounding.
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Note that we do not argue that unfounded calls are without merit. It is unknown whether
events are unfounded because they are truly non-events or because officers are using their
discretion to reduce their workload. This variation in the application of the unfounded
disposition is critical to the current study. We use unfounded events to better understand
how police officers shed workload in the face of varying levels of serious crimes and
officer resources.
Independent Variables
District workload is a critical component to the ecological theory of policing. Except
in situations of homicide and threats to officer safety, vigor toward less-serious events is
reduced when workload is high and resources are scarce. These crime types, therefore,
make an excellent measure of officer workload. However, because the count value of
homicides becomes unstable when broken down by months and by districts, this measure
could not be adopted for these models. Instead these models employed serious crimes4 as a
measure of officer workload. The number of officer assaults, as an additional proxy for
officer workload, was also included as an independent variable.
Officer staffing levels are critical to the relationship between vigor and crime for two
reasons. First, the ecological theory argues that the relationship between crime and officer
staffing levels, not the absolute values of either, determines how vigorously officers respond
to an incident. Second, because police strength has been linked theoretically and empirically
to police effectiveness (Crank 1990; Klick and Tararrok 2005; Levitt 1997, 2002; McCrary
2002), higher levels of police presence may act as a deterrent to crime. Officer staffing was
measured with two variables: (1) the number of patrol officer-hours worked within each
district and (2) the number of officer overtime hours worked within each district. These
measures were constructed from deidentified officer staffing records obtained directly from
the PPD. The records contained the work status (for example, if the officer was working, on
vacation, or out sick) of every officer within the department. Data were obtained from the
second Tuesday of every month during the study period. This day was selected because it
represented an ‘‘average’’ day for the department that was free from overlapping shift
schedules. The officer staffing on the second Tuesday of the month was used to represent the
officer staffing level of each district for that specific month.
From this dataset it was possible to identify officers working on patrol and the district to
which they were assigned. The first step was to select only cases that were assigned to district-
specific units. Officers that were assigned to specific districts were then further parsed so that
only officers assigned to patrol were selected. After these cases were selected, the number of
hours each officer worked was calculated. These officer-hours were then aggregated by
district to produce a district-level, temporally variable, measure of officer staffing.
Although this measure of officer staffing captures the majority of patrol resources, it
does not address officers who may be working overtime or during times when they are not
normally scheduled. To capture these numbers, we constructed a separate measure of the
number of overtime hours officers were working in each district. Overtime hours were
4 There was a need to distinguish between serious and less-serious incidents. Less-serious incidents are
regarded as providing the officer with more ambiguity about the necessary course of action and therefore
greater discretion on how much official authority to exercise. The more-serious versus less-serious dis-
tinction was made on the basis of Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
Part One and Part Two offenses. Serious offenses—Part One—include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, residential and nonresidential burglaries and attempts, theft, vehicle theft (attempts and recoveries),
and arson.
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calculated for activities that could be related to patrol but excluded hours earned for
appearing in court or other non-patrol-related capacity (e.g., sporting events or parade
routes). Figure 2 illustrates citywide trends for officer-hours and overtime hours.
Several limitations to these measures must be considered. First, because the dataset is
limited in geographic identifiers, it was not possible to account for special units (such as
the narcotics strike force or highway patrol) that are not assigned to a single district.
Second, the use of 1 day to represent each month’s officer staffing level presents the
possibility that things may change substantially from day to day. Ideally, each daily
activity measure would be averaged over the entire month. Given the time-consuming
nature of requesting data (a rather substantial imposition on the PPD) and the necessary
data processing, this was not feasible. Descriptive statistics for monthly time-varying
variables can be found in Table 2.
This analysis required population data for the study period, 2004–2008. Because the
U.S. Census is conducted only once every 10 years, we had no readily available sources of
demographic data at the spatial and temporal resolution required by this analysis. Instead
this study employed demographic estimates created by GeoLytics5 (2009). These post-
censal estimates are not without their limitations. In general, they are less accurate for
smaller geographies and less accurate the farther away in time they are from the original
data source (Raymondo 1992). Nevertheless, these data provided the best possible solution
to the otherwise intractable problem of conducting longitudinal analyses on variables that
are contingent upon the changing sociodemographic fabric of the community.
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5 Details of GeoLytics’ estimation methodology can be found at http://www.geolytics.com/. Changes
created by the birth, death, or moving of residential populations are used to create estimated census
population data, which are then verified against yearly municipality census counts.
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Crime is an inherently spatial process (Griffiths and Chavez 2004; Unwin and Unwin
1998), and any analysis conducted must explicitly control for this spatial patterning or run
the risk of false indicators of significance and biased parameter estimates (Anselin 1999;
Messner et al. 1999). Calculation of the measure of spatial association was conducted on
the monthly count of events in each district. Moran’s I values were calculated with a
Euclidean-based inverse distance weights matrix. The default neighborhood search
threshold was calculated to be 13,947 feet (the minimum distance required to ensure that
all police districts had at least one neighbor). Moran’s I values ranged from\0.01 to 0.27
and were generally, but not always, nonsignificant and varied depending on the month
under investigation. A three-nearest-neighbor spatial lag variable created using the spatial
data analysis program GeoDa (Anselin 2004) was used to control for any possible spatial
effects. The three-nearest-neighbor approach creates a spatial lag value from the crime
counts of the three police districts closest to the target district. A unique spatial lag variable
was created for each month. To prevent the artificial creation of isolated police districts, we
included all 25 districts in this calculation.
Analytical Technique
A critical choice must be made between using the crime rate or the count of crimes as the
dependent variable (Harries 1991). Many analyses use a rate variable as an outcome where the
numerator is the phenomenon of interest and the denominator provides an adjustment for the
environmental risk or opportunity (Harries 1991). Several limitations to the use of rates as
dependent variables have been identified. Most importantly, including a denominator in the
dependent variable changes the relationship between the outcome of interest and the inde-
pendent variables. Because the numerator and the denominator may interact with unmeasured
variance in different ways, the use of rates can be problematic (Gibbs and Firebaugh 1990).
From a statistical perspective, the use of rates creates problems when dealing with rare events.
The precision of the estimated crime rate varies by population size. Predictions of crime rates
would be expected to produce larger errors in areas of low population and smaller errors in areas
of high population, violating the assumption of homogeneity of error variance (Knoke et al.
2002). Additionally, the error terms will not be normally distributed when the number of events
is small. Error terms become increasingly skewed as crime rates approach zero (Osgood 2000).
Under these circumstances, count regression models are appropriate (Long and Freese 2006)
and were therefore adopted in these analyses.6
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for monthly varying variables
Mean Median SD Variance Skewness Minimum Maximum
Unfounded events 1219.04 1066 690.44 476,711.60 1.08 63 4059
Serious incidents 328.22 324 133.29 17,765.43 0.34 71 803
Officer assaults 1.22 1 133.29 2.70 2.06 0 10
Patrol hours 411:01 408:06 20:53 13,944.52 0.22 155:45 753:30
Overtime hours 26:13 23:00 20:53 436.22 1.11 0:00 166:39
N = 1380
6 The outcome variable followed an overdispersed Poisson distribution. Therefore all models were specified
as Poisson with overdispersion.
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Nonlinear, longitudinal, multilevel models were employed to investigate the relation-
ship between changing crime trends and their impact on officer vigor. Multilevel modeling
was used because it allows for investigation of temporal trends while respecting the district
boundaries as an important organizational unit. The level-1 unit, months included time-
varying covariates such as the district-level serious incidents and the availability of police
resources (measured through the sum of officer staffing hours). This analysis was con-
ducted on 5 years (2004 through 2008) of monthly (n = 60) crime data. The level-2 unit of
analysis was police districts (n = 23). The outcome measure was the count of unfounded
events per month, per district.
All multilevel models were specified so that the predictor variables were group mean
centered (subtracting the level-2 district mean value from the level-1 value). The longi-
tudinal models were conducted to investigate the temporally dynamic trends of officer
vigor. By group mean centering the independent variables, the models are investigating the
change in officer vigor within each district over time, thus allowing for the investigation of
changing dynamics within the district.
A priori analysis of power was conducted using Optimal Design for Multi-level and
Longitudinal Research (Version 1.77) (Liu et al. 2006). Power in multilevel modeling is
sensitive to four factors: (1) the number of level-1 and level-2 units, (2) the effect size,
(3) the alpha level, and (4) the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) (Raudenbush 1997;
Raudenbush and Liu 2000; Spybrook et al. 2008). The number of level-1 units was con-
sistent across all level-2 units (n = 60). Second, consistent with Cohen (1992), effect sizes
(Cohen’s d) of 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 were selected to represent small, medium, and large
effects, respectively. An alpha level of 0.05 was adopted. Fourth, following Raudenbush
and Liu (2000), ICC values of 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 were adopted to represent small,
medium, and large variances, respectively. Using these assumptions about effect size,
alpha levels, and ICC values, we determined power to be acceptable under large and
medium effect sizes.
Results
Local indicators of spatial association (LISA) values indicated high levels of unfounded
events clustered (high–high) in North Philadelphia and smaller clusters in the south.
Significant low–low clusters could be found in the northwest section of Philadelphia, along
with a smaller cluster located near Center City (the central business district of Philadel-
phia). Figure 3 shows the location of significant unfounded event clusters.
The analysis of variance (Table 3, Model 1) indicated an average of 1067 unfounded
events per month, per district, during the study period. Longitudinal multilevel models can
be found in Table 3.
Ongoing Temporal Trends
The linear time trend variable indicated a significant decline in unfounded events during
the study period. The number of unfounded events was decreasing roughly 1.2% per month
across all districts (Model 2). The quadratic variable was positive and significant, indi-
cating an accelerating positive trend in the number of unfounded events during the study
period. Although the overall trend may be decreasing (as indicated by the linear trend
variable), there was a significant uptick in unfounded events toward the end of the study
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period. The temperature variable7 was significant and positive, indicating that a 10-degree
change in temperature was related to an 8.5% increase in the number of unfounded events
per month, per district (Model 2). The number of days was also associated with the number
Fig. 3 LISA clusters of unfounded events
7 Historical weather data were retrieved from the Weather Underground (www.wunderground.com) History
and Data Archive. The variable was created by calculating the daily average, monthly average temperature
(the average daily temperature averaged over the month).
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of unfounded events. Adding one additional day per month was associated with a 3.5%
increase in the number of unfounded events per month, per district, net of other temporal
trends (Model 2). The direction, general magnitude, and significance of these variables
were consistent across model specification (compare Models 2 through 5).
Population and Spatial Effects
Population and spatial effects were added beginning with Model 3. The spatial lag term
was positive and significant, indicating that higher levels of unfounded events in neigh-
boring police districts were significantly associated with higher levels of unfounding in the
target district. Population was also positively and significantly related to the number of
unfounded events. A 1000-unit increase in the count of residential population was asso-
ciated with a 4% increase in the expected count of unfounded events, net of ongoing trends
(Model 3). Both population and the spatial lag terms were positive and significant across
all model specifications.
Workload
Serious incidents were positively linked to the number of unfounded events. On average, a
100-unit increase in the number of serious incidents per month, per district, was associated
with a 5.5% increase in the number of unfounded events per month, per district, net of
spatial effects, population, and ongoing temporal trends (Model 5). The number of officer
assaults was not significantly related to the number of unfounded events (Models 4 and 5).
Officer Staffing
Both the number of officer hours assigned to patrol and the number of overtime hours for
patrol purposes were entered into Model 5. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a 100-h
increase in officers assigned to patrol was associated with a 4.4% decrease in the number of
unfounded events, net of workload, population, spatial effects, and ongoing temporal
trending, per month, per district. The number of overtime hours was not significantly
related to the count of unfounded events (model 5).
Discussion
Vigor, as operationalized by the number of unfounded events, was consistently related to
workload (operationalized through the number of serious incidents). Higher workload was
associated with higher levels of unfounded events, net of other relevant characteristics.
Officer staffing was also consistently related to the level of vigor in the direction expected
based on theoretical predictions. A greater number of officer hours were associated with
fewer unfounded events, suggesting that greater patrol resources reduces the number of
unfounded events.
We note that these relationships were statistically significant but relatively small in
magnitude. Rather large changes in staffing or workload would be needed to produce small
changes in unfounded activity. The fully specified model suggests a 100-unit increase in
serious incidents per month was associated with a 5.5% increase in the number of
unfounded events. For the ‘‘average district’’ in the ‘‘average month’’ this would amount to
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a 30% increase in violent crime. The relationship between staffing and unfounded events
was similar. A 100-h increase in patrol staffing was associated with a 4.4% decrease in
unfounded events. For the ‘‘average district’’ in the ‘‘average month’’ this change would
amount to a 25% increase in staffing. Future research should focus on better opera-
tionalizing workload and staffing to assess these relationships in higher fidelity.
The relation between overtime hours and officer vigor was nonsignificant. One possible
explanation for this finding was that it was not possible to accurately classify exactly why
officers were getting overtime. If overtime hours were used to process an arrest made
toward the end of an officer’s shift, then those hours would not have an impact on the
outcomes studied here. A measure of overtime hours that captured only the quantity of
officer hours worked on the street in a patrol capacity was not possible with the available
data.
The spatial lag was significant across all model specifications. Higher levels of
unfounded events in the three nearest neighboring police districts were significantly
associated with higher levels of the outcome in the target district. This finding was
unexpected for a number of reasons. First, the theory argues that the district is the key
ecological unit of analysis. Norms regarding workload develop at the district level, which
leads to the development of districts that are largely independent of the influence of other
districts. The spatial lag variable would suggest that the districts are not as independent as
postulated, and perhaps some spatial process was crossing district boundaries. In
Philadelphia at least, districts are subsets of larger parts of the city that tend to be more
similar in terms of socioeconomics, crime, and disorder. Incorporating other measures on
the ecological characteristics of the district may shed light on this relationship. Second, the
analytic choices made regarding the decision to group mean center the spatial lag variable
means that the spatial lag variable was measuring the influence of other districts on the
target districts’ change over time. The impact of the spatial lag can be thought of as the
unique effect of nearby districts on the time-varying outcome. This implies that there was a
time-varying dynamic that crossed district boundaries at work. Finally, given the size of
police districts, a strong spatial effect would not necessarily have been expected. Police
districts are large, especially when compared with block groups or census tracts. While it
would be reasonable to expect that social or environmental processes would cross smaller
geographic boundaries, such boundary crossing would be less expected for very large
ecological units such as police districts.
It would appear that internal district dynamics are sensitive not only to crime levels
within their own district but also to characteristics of the surrounding districts. This finding
may indicate that organizational dynamics do indeed cross district boundaries in a way that
is counter to theoretical explanations. Alternatively, the spatial lag variable may be picking
up the additional patrol-related activity generated by special operation units such as the
narcotics strike force or highway patrol.
These models demonstrated that varying levels of officer workload have an impact on
an officer’s general willingness to investigate potential criminal activity (in the form of
unfounded events). This finding links to broader research investigating the relationship
between the number of officers in a police department and the crime level in the juris-
diction (see Levitt 1997, for a summary of this research). Although historically researchers
have failed to find an association between police staffing and crime levels (Cameron 1988),
recent improvements in data measurement and analytic techniques have generated a
resurgence in research suggesting that police can indeed reduce crime (see, for example,
Klick and Tararrok 2005; Levitt 2002).
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The current research approaches the issue from a different angle and asks if it is possible
to measure the relationship between officer staffing and the quantity of ‘‘work’’ produced.
These results suggest that there is a significant relationship between officer staffing and
officer vigor. This is useful information for police departments that frequently need to
argue for adequate officer staffing levels or for departments looking to evaluate issues
revolving around staffing levels. This research suggests that realistic changes to the level of
officer staffing can have measurable and significant impacts upon the work output of patrol
officers. This finding also suggests important avenues for future research. It would be
informative to know whether this relationship exists for other types of police activity. For
example, what is the relationship between officer staffing and clearance rates? What is the
relationship between officer staffing levels and officer call response time? It may also be
worth inquiring how officer staffing levels affect case disposition for situations other than
unfounded events.
Finding that patrol officer work output is sensitive to both officer resources and officer
workload has larger implications for the criminal justice system as a whole. Taken together
as a system, this suggests that patrol officers with greater resources or less workload are
likely to engage in a greater level of work. This increased work output has the potential to
drive unintended consequences for the rest of the criminal justice system. Goldkamp and
Vıˆlcica˘ (2008: 374) refer to these as ‘‘system side effects’’ and caution that intensive police
operations may result in negative consequences for courts and corrections. If this is true,
then it may be wise to spend this additional capacity on crime prevention initiatives, such
as problem-oriented policing, rather than on more enforcement-focused, zero-tolerance-
type programs.
Limitations of the Current Study and Avenues of Future Research
These findings have demonstrated that the operationalization of key theoretical constructs
is a critical decision that must be undertaken with great care. Taken as a whole, these
results suggest that concepts of ‘‘serious’’ events need further elaboration and clarification.
Use of Uniform Crime Reporting classifications to determine serious or less-serious events
was originally adopted to avoid arbitrary, subjective, and potentially unreliable estimates.
Future development of the ecological theory of policing may require better methods of
classifying the seriousness of an event. This may entail surveying police officers to
determine their views on the seriousness of crime events. Such a study would need to
account for numerous potential threats to internal validity and ensure that officers from all
districts, with various ranks, and with a range of tenures are surveyed.
Operationalizing other key constructs presented additional issues. The use of crime data
as a measure of officer workload may be problematic. Although Klinger’s theory argues
that officers are unlikely to unfound serious incidents, this assumption is by no means
definitive. Exploring other methods of quantifying workload remains an important avenue
for future research. Measurements of officer response times to calls, the length of time an
officer spends at calls, or the number of calls an officer responds to (calls for service) may
be alternative indicators of officer workload.
Officer staffing hours were found to be significant and in the direction predicted by
theory. Our measure of officer staffing was relatively crude, as we were able to measure
only 1 day of staffing per month. We were also unable to measure the presence of special
units within the districts. This makes it impossible to tease out the impact these additional
officers have on vigor and workload. The effect of these additional officers on models
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should be reduced because they typically do not respond to normal calls for service. As
such, their impact on patrol officer workload should be relatively small.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that this evaluation is not a comprehensive test of
Klinger’s ecological theory. A more comprehensive evaluation of these intervening pro-
cesses would require an extensive, wide-scale data collection effort. Illuminating those
intervening processes—for example, the individual and group understandings of crime and
deviance—would be best attempted by field observations and interviews with officers.
Combining officer-level information about understandings of the normality of crime, the
deservedness of victims, or cynicism with administrative indicators of workload and crime
levels would allow for a more complete understanding of the theory. The current study
must accept that the intervening processes between district workload and the vigor of
police action must remain a black box and cannot be disentangled given the information
available. The findings of this study, however, suggest that Klinger’s theory has enough
validity to justify exploring these intervening measures.
Conclusion
These findings, in general, support the key propositions first laid out by Klinger more than
a decade ago. Klinger’s ecological theory of policing, as originally conceived, would be
very difficult to test directly. No department is going to keep enough time-sensitive
indicators to reliably model the underlying dynamic processes (at both the individual and
group levels). This lack of relevant indicators is not an insurmountable problem, but
addressing it would require extensive, large-scale data collection using both field obser-
vations and interviews with officers. A more difficult problem to resolve is the relatively
small number of districts found in each department. Even the largest police department in
the country has fewer than 100 districts. This issue, again, is not insurmountable. It is
possible, for example, to imagine data collection at numerous police departments, thereby
ameliorating issues relating to the small number of districts in each individual police
department. Taken together, however, these two points may suggest that evaluating
Klinger’s ecological theory using quantitative methodologies may be practically implau-
sible, if not necessarily impossible. Although directly testing the totality of Klinger’s
theory may be beyond reach, the current study suggests several ways of expanding and
clarifying Klinger’s theory in a direction that makes it a more viable subject for empirical
assessment.
Perhaps the critical finding from these findings was that vigor varies as a result of officer
workload and resource constraint. Although the magnitude was relatively small, greater
workload or lower levels of officer resources lowered the quantity of vigor expended.
Other findings suggest that further conceptual development is still required. These findings,
taken as a whole, suggest that the ecological theory of policing has strength and utility in
explaining patterns of police activity but also that a number of issues could use further
conceptual clarity.
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